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JIMMY HOFFA'S REVENGE: WHITE-COLLAR RIGHTS UNDER 
THE McDADE AMENDMENT 
John G. Douglass· 
INTRODUCTION 
On a hot July day in 1975, Jimmy Hoffa disappeared. Odds are he was lured 
to his death by a trusted friend. 1 Ironi~ally, almost a decade before his 
disappearance, Hoffa had made his mark on the law in a case foreshadowing the 
very weakness that later may have killed him: an overconfident reliance on the 
loyalty of a confidant. In that 1966 case, 2 in which much of the evidence came from 
the mouth of a colleague whose allegiance had been secretly purchased by the FBI, 
Hoffa tried to convince the Supreme Court that the target of a criminal investigation 
enjoyed a constitutional right not to be contacted by government agents or 
informants in the absence of his counsel. At the time, Hoffa's claim had the 
advantage of judicial momentum. Only two years earlier, the Court had hinted at 
a broad "no-contact" right for criminal suspects under the Sixth Amendment. 3 But 
the Court switched gears in Hoffa's case, and that momentum came to an end. The 
decision in Hoffa v. United States4 became the first in a series that effectively 
removed Sixth Amendment protection from suspects until the moment they are 
formally charged with a crime. 5 The end result is that, today, the Sixth Amendment 
• Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. I want to express thanks to 
Dan Richman, for the benefit of his experience and insight. Thanks also to my Richmond 
colleagues, Jim Gibson, Elizabeth Nowicki, and Corinna Lain for their many helpful 
comments. Thanks to my research assistant, Leah Nelson, for her fine efforts in following the 
trail of Jimmy Hoffa. Finally, special thanks to Paul Marcus for his many kindnesses, not the 
least of which was his invitation to participate in this White-Collar Crime Symposiwn. 
1 Hoffa's July 1975 disappearance remains shrouded in mystery. The FBI has theorized 
that a Hoffa confidante, Charles (Chuckie) O'Brien, lured Hoffa into a car and disposed of 
him under orders from a New Jersey mobster. See L.L. Brasier, Oakland Gives Up on Hoffa 
Probe, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Aug. 30, 2002, 2002 WL 22380668. Federal agents still have 
an open investigation but lack solid evidence to charge anyone with kidnaping or murder. Id. 
Last August, an Oakland County, Michigan grand jury investigatiOn ended with no charges 
and little hope of solving the mystery. Id. For a detailed account of what is known about 
Hoffa's disappearance, see ARTHUR A. SLOANE, HOFFA 374-92 {1991). 
2 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
3 See Escobedo v. Illinois, 3 78 U.S. 4 78 ( 1964) (holding that, when police have focused 
on a suspect, any statements made during an interrogation - and after the request for a 
lawyer - are inadmissible). 
4 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
5 See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986); Kirby v. Illinoi~, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); 
Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 309-10; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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offers virtually nothing to a suspect until he becomes a defendant. 
But Hoffa's arguments outlived Hoffa. His constitutional claims were 
resurrected as a rule of legal ethics. That rule - now Rule 4.2 of the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct6 - states that a lawyer may not communicate with 
the opposing party to a legal dispute when that person is represented by counsel. 
At the time of Hoffa's case, few lawyers and fewer courts would have believed that 
the "no-contact" rule of legal ethics had anything to do with efforts of FBI agents 
or informants to investigate crime; even when the suspect had retained counsel. 7 
But today, with the assistance of a compliant Congress spurred on by a disgruntled 
target of an unsuccessful political corruption investigation, Rule 4.2 stands as a 
formidable shield between investigators and targets of white-collar investigations. 
Indeed, the protections which Hoffa claimed as a matter of constitutional right have 
expanded well beyond the limits of Hoffa's legal imagination, thanks to Rule 4.2 
and Congressman Joseph McDade. 8 
This Essay focuses on the right that Hoffa sought but never won, and which · 
now exists for a few criminal suspects by virtue of Rule 4.2. It is about the "white-
collar right" to avoid contact with investigators and informants during a criminal 
investigation. 9 I use the term "white-collar right" because, as a practical matter, the 
6 Rule 4.2 provides: 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the 
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another 
lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is 
authorized to do so by law or a court order. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2002). The last phrase, "or a court order," was 
proposed by the ABA's "Ethics 2000 Commission" and approved by the ABA House of 
Delegates in February 2002. See 70 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 412 (Feb. 13, 2002) .. 
7 See William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. REV. 
1903, 1904 n.2 (1993); cf Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 21~1 l (1964) (White, 
J., dissenting) (noting that the rule of ethics "deals with the conduct oflawyers and not with 
the conduct of investigators"). 
8 McDade was the author and principal sponsor of the Citizens Protection Act, also 
known as the"McDadeAmendment,"28 U.S.C. § 530B(a)-(b), which provided that federal 
prosecutors are subject to the ethical rules of each state in which they practice. For an 
excellent rendition of the genesis of the McDade Amendment, see Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce 
A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88 Goo. L.J. 207, 208-15 (2000). 
9 I focus on contacts by government investigators, rather than on direct contacts between 
suspects and prosecutors, for two main reasons. First, direct prosecutor-to-suspect contacts 
are comparatively rare, whereas contacts by investigators and informants are ubiquitous. As 
a result, Rule 4.2 principally impacts criminal investigations when it limits contacts by agents 
and informants. Second, I aim to compare the Rule 4.2 approach with Sixth Amendment case 
law that deals principally with contacts by investigating agents. Of course, much of what I 
argue infra would apply equally in the case of direct contact by prosecutors. Nevertheless, 
I should acknowledge that direct contacts in some settings can raise additional concerns not 
addressed here, particularly when the contact evolves from evidence gathering into plea 
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protection of Rule 4.2 is enjoyed almost exclusively by individuals and corporations 
during investigations of white-collar crimes. That protection is not available to 
most suspects of most police investigations, because most people suspected of a 
crime do not have lawyers before criminal charges are filed. 10 
I begin the Essay with a bit of comparative history. In Part I, I describe the 
death and burial of the Sixth Amendment no-contact rule espoused by Jimmy Hoffa. 
In Part II, I contrast the birth and expansion of an extra-constitutional no-contact 
rule under Model Rule 4.2 and the McDade Amendment. I begin with these 
contrasting histories because I believe they illustrate two critical points about the 
no-contact rule in criminal investigations. First, despite its place in codes of ethics, 
the no-contact rule in criminal investigations has little to do with ethics. Instead, 
today's debate over Rule 4.2 is simply the latest chapter in a debate over what is, 
and what is not, a fair tactic of criminal investigation - a debate that began even 
before Hoffa's case. 11 Second, this comparative history illustrates that, when it 
comes to shielding suspects from direct contacts with investigators, we treat white-
collar suspects much more favorably than others, and we treat corporations more 
favorably than anyone. And that comparison leads to the central questions of Part 
III: Why should we treat white-collar suspects so differently? And, when we apply 
a broad no-contact rule to corporations, whose interests are we really protecting? 
I. JIMMY HOFF A'S SIXTH AMENDMENT LEGACY - THE DEMISE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL DURING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 
The Sixth Amendment provides a right to counsel for the "accused" in "all 
criminal prosecutions."12 The language implies an important limit to that right: It 
applies only when we have an "accused" in a "prosecution." The words suggest 
that a suspect\ has no Sixth Amendment right to counsel's protection during an 
investigation when he has not yet been "accused" by the filing of a criminal charge. 
Not surprisingly, that is how today's Supreme Court reads the Sixth Amendment, 13 
but it was not always so. 
At least for a few years in the mid-1960s, the Court signaled a broader reading, 
recognizing a right to counsel before the filing of a criminal charge. Counsel's 
negotiation. 
10 See infra Part III.A. 
11 The central questions in that debate are: ( l) whether we should allow criminal 
investigators to seek incriminating information directly from the mouths of those we suspect 
of criminal activity, without the presence of an attorney to advise the suspect; and (2) whether 
we should allow investigators to deceive their targets in the process. Hoffa, of course, lost 
that debate on both counts. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
12 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. . 
13 See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 ( 1972) (holding that the Sixth Amendment 
attaches at the initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings). 
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assistance at trial would hardly matter, the Court reasoned, if the adversarial game 
was over before trial began. 14 A confession obtained in the absence of counsel, 
either by police questioning or by an informant's deceit, "would make the trial no 
more than an appeal from the interrogation."15 Thus, to give practical effect to the 
right to counsel at trial, there must be some protection against contacts by 
investigators before trial. Pursuing that logic in its 1964 decision in Massiah v. 
United States, 16 the Court ruled that the government violated the Sixth Amendment 
by deliberately eliciting information from an accused in the absence of his 
counsel. 17 The Court was unimpressed with the government's claim that Massiah 
voluntarily chose to confide in a supposed friend without a lawyer present. 18 
Massiah '"was more seriously imposed upon,"' the Court wrote, "'because he did 
not even know that he was under interrogation by a govenini.ent agent. "'19 
The prohibited undercover contact in Massiah took place after indictment.20 
Only a few months later, in Escobedo v. Illinois,21 the Court further extended its 
Sixth Amendment no-contact rule to prohibit uncounseled interrogation of suspects 
who had become the "focus" of criminal investigation. 22 Because many-probably 
most - criminal investigations tend to "focus" on particular suspects, the potential 
reach of Escobedo was revolutionary. Criminal investigators might violate the 
Sixth Amendment by questioning a suspect in the absence of counsel, either directly 
or through an informant, well before charges were filed. Recognizing the potential 
breadth of the Court's ruling, Justice White argued in dissent that the prohibition 
on investigative contacts would be "wholly unworkable and impossible to 
administer unless police cars are equipped with public defenders and undercover 
agents and police informants have defense counsel at their side. "23 Despite that 
warning, the Court seemed poised to embark on a course that would revolutionize 
police work, largely eliminating criminal suspects as a source of information for 
investigators. 
Enter Jimmy Hoffa. In the Fall of 1962, Hoffa was tried in Nashville, 
14 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 487 (1964). 
IS Id. 
16 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
17 Id. at 203-04. 
18 Id.at2ll-12. 
19 
.Id. at 206 (quoting United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1962)). 
20 Massiah, 377 U.S. at 212. 
21 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
22 Id. at 490. The Escobedo majority stated its holding somewhat more narro;,,,ly, limiting 
the ruling to cases in which the suspect was in custody and demanded counsel. Id. at 491. But 
the Court's reasoning suggested broader application of the no-contact rule. As Justice White 
noted in dissent, "[t]he right to counsel now ... stands as an impenetrable barrier to any 
interrogation once the accused has become a suspect." Id. at 496 (White, J., dissenting). 
23 Id. at 496. . 
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Tennessee on federal racketeering charges.24 The case ended in a hung jury.25 
Edward Partin, a Teamsters official from Louisiana, spent the months of the trial in 
and around the hotel where Hoffa and his lawyers plotted defense strategy.26 
Characteristically, Hoffa had a separate, ex~ralegal, strategy of his own which he 
shared in conversations with Partin. 27 As "insurance" against conviction, Hoffa was 
s·eeking to bribe jurors. 28 But Hoffa had miscalculated. Partin was in Nashville 
only because federal agents had obtained his release from a Louisiana prison, 
arranged to drop state and federal charges against him, and made "expense" 
payments through Partin' s wife. 29 In short, Partin was a paid government informant 
who reported to federal agents as Hoffa's jury tampering scheme developed. 
Hoffa was later charged and convicted of jury tampering. 30 Partin was the 
government's chief witness. 31 Hoffa objected to Partin's testimony on a host of 
grounds,32 including the Sixth Amendment. When his case made it to the Supreme 
Court in 1964, Hoffa sought to ride the crest of Massiah and Escobedo. Just as it 
had done in Massiah, Hoffa claimed, the government ignored his right to counsel 
when it contacted him through an informant and obtained incriminating statements 
in the absence of his lawyers. 33 He was the focus of a jury-tampering investigation. 
Therefore, under Escobedo, his right to counsel attached just as fully as if he had 
been arrested and charged. 34 
The Court, however, had other ideas. Giving barely a nod to Massiah and 
Escobedo, the Court dispatched Hoffa's Sixth Amendment claim with the pithy 
phrase, "[t]here is no constitutional right to be arrested."35 The idea that the right 
to counsel's protection against government contacts might extend to earlier stages 
of investigation, before a suspect was arrested and charged, had just disappeared. 
Hoffa's case was actually the second blow that the Court delivered in the 
Summer of 1966 to the developing notion that the Sixth Amendment might prohibit 
24 See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 294 (1966). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 296. 
27 Id. 
2s Id. 
29 Id. at 297-98. 
30 Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 298-88. 
31 Id. at 298. 
32 Aside from his Sixth Amendment claim, Hoffa argued that the government violated the 
Fourth Amendment when Partin, a government infonnant, entered his hotel suite under false 
pretenses and later reported private conversations. Id. at 300. He also claimed that the 
government violated the Fifth Amendment when Partin obtained incriminating admissions, 
id. at 303, and that the "totality" of government misconduct during the Nashville trial 
deprived him of due process, id. at 310. The Court rejected all of Hoffa's claims. Id. at 31 J. 
33 Id. at 309-10. 
34 See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485-86 (1964). 
35 Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 310. 
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investigative contacts with suspects in the absence of a lawyer. A few months 
earlier, the Court's ruling in Miranda v. Arizona36 had marked a fundamental shift 
in the Court's approach to regulating contacts between police and suspects. Both 
sides had briefed and argued Miranda and its companion cases on the basis of the 
Sixth Amendment principles established in Massiah and Escobedo.37 But when 
Chief Justice Warren delivered the Miranda opinion, the Court shifted 
constitutional gears. Perhaps because of the fears voiced by Justice White in 
Escobedo, the Court no longer insisted on counsel's presence during questioning 
of suspects who had become the focus of investigation.38 Rather, the Miranda 
Court chose a Fifth Amendment approach that focused on custody and coercion.39 
Counsel had a role in the process, the Court acknowledged, but that role was to 
protect against coercion.40 The decision whether to talk in the absence of counsel 
was left up to a properly warned suspect.41 
Miranda and Hoffa effectively halted the momentum of the Sixth Amendment 
no-contact rule for criminal investigations. Still, it took another twenty years to 
clarify the Court's direction. By 1972, in Kirby v. Illinois, 42 the Court made explicit 
what was implicit in Hoffa and Miranda. 43 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
"attaches," the Court held, "only at or after the time that adversary judicial 
proceedings have been initiated. "44 In other words, the Sixth Amendment would 
provide no protection to suspects before they were charged with a crime.45 In 1986, 
the Court buried the last trace of Escobedo's no-contact rule.46 In Moran v. 
Burbine,47 a properly Mirandized suspect chose to answer police questions without 
36 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
37 See JEROLD H. ISRAEL ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTITUTION 331 
(2002). 
38 Indeed, in a brief footnote that can most charitably be described as revisionist history, 
the Court declared that its use of the term "focus" in Escobedo was intended to mean 
"custody." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 n.4. 
39 Id. at 462. 
40 Id. at 465-66. 
41 Id. at 444. 
42 406 U.S. 682 (1972). 
43 Compare Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966), and Miranda, 384 U.S. 
at 510, with Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688. 
44 Id. at 688. 
45 In Kirby, the Court finished one task that it had begun in Miranda: It distinguished 
Escobedo by rewriting it. See Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689. Escobedo was, quite explicitly, a Sixth 
Amendment opinion. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 479 (1964). The Kirby Court, 
however, wrote that "the 'prime purpose' of Escobedo was not to vindicate the constitutional 
right to counsel as such, but, like Miranda, 'to guarantee full effectuation of the privilege 
against self-incrimination."' Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689 (quoting Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 
U.S. 719, 729 (1966)). 
46 See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). 
41 Id. 
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counsel present, not knowing that his family had retained a lawyer for him and that 
police had informed the lawyer that no interrogation would take place.48 Because 
the suspect had not been formally charged, the Court held, there was no· Sixth 
Amendment right to violate.49 Further, the Court rejected Burbine's claim that 
retaining counsel had triggered his Sixth Amendment rights despite the absence of 
a formal charge. so 
Hoffa's constitutional legacy was complete. Until charged with a crime, 
suspects simply had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel. And it did not matter 
whether, like Burbine, they managed to retain counsel at an earlier stage or, like 
Hoffa, they were already represented in a related matter. By 1986, the basic 
rationale for the Court's approach was relatively clear. It rested in part on the 
language of the Sixth Amendment, which applies when there is an "accused" in a 
"criminal prosecution."s 1 The Court also recognized the practical impossibility of 
providing counsel to a vast array of uncharged suspects at different points during 
the police investigation. s2 It saw little prospect for drawing a line between 
permissible and impermissible police-suspect contacts at an earlier stage of 
investigation. s3 The moment of formal charging was, relatively speaking, a bright-
line rule. It was, after all, the line that marked "the starting point of our whole 
system of adversary criminal justice."54 - Finally, the protections afforded by 
Miranda had left the Court with diminished concern that the presence of counsel 
was necessary to prevent abuses during investigative contacts with suspects.ss 
II. HOFFA'S REVENGE: THE RISE OF WHITE-COLLAR RIGHTS 
UNDER RULE 4.2 AND THE MCDADE AMENDMENT 
A. The Birth of an Extra-Constitutional Tool for Limiting Contacts with Suspects 
At the time Jimmy Hoffa brought his case to the Supreme Court, contacts 
48 Id. at417-18. 
49 Id. at 428-29. 
so Id. at 430 ("As a practical matter, it makes little sense to say that the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel attaches at different times depending on the fortuity of whether the suspect 
or his family happens to have retained counsel prior to interrogation."). 
51 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Burbine, 475 U.S. at 430. 
52 Burbine, 475 U.S. at 430. 
53 Id. at 426-27. 
54 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 ( 1972). 
55 Instead, in marked contrast to the tone of both Massiah and Escobedo, the post-Hoffa 
Court seemed to applaud the use of non-coercive investigative contacts, even in counsel's 
absence, because they produced reliable evidence. "The Sixth Amendment's intended 
function is not to ... protect a suspect from the consequences of his own candor." Moran v. 
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 430 (1986). 
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between prosecuting attorneys and criminal suspects were seldom a matter of 
concern in the world of legal ethics. White-collar prosecution was in its infancy. 56 
For the most part, the police handled the dirty business of gathering evidence and 
interrogating suspects. When luck or the policeman's cunning allowed it, that 
business included tricking suspects into incriminating disclosures by using 
informants or undercover officers. 57 Both prosecutors and defense counsel typically 
entered the picture at a later stage, at or after the time when criminal charges were 
filed. 58 Legal ethics seldom came into play largely because lawyers were not central 
players in criminal investigations. 
The traditional picture of police investigation began to change at about the time 
Hoffa was released from federal prison. Accelerating through the 1970s, especially 
after ~he Watergate disclosures, federal prosecutions of white-collar crime 
multiplied in numbers and grew in size and complexity.59 The growth of white-
collar prosecutions thrust more lawyers into criminal investigations at earlier stages. 
In white-collar investigations, prosecutors control the grand jury subpoena 
process,60 question witnesses before the grand jury,61 assess the evidence as it 
develops over weeks or months, and advise agents on the wide range oflegal issues 
that a complex investigation can present. Likewise, on the defense side, white-
collar investigations bring lawyers into the picture early. Unlike suspects in more 
routine cases, white-collar suspects and their corporate employers typically have the 
means to hire counsel, and they do so at the first hint oftrouble.62 Not surprisingly, 
the expansion of white-collar prosecutions in the 1970s gave rise to corresponding 
56 See KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 19-20 ( 1985). 
57 The use of informants, and judicial approval of the practice, are of ancient origin. 
Judge Learned Hand wrote that"[ c ]ourts have countenanced the use of informers from time 
immemorial; in cases of conspiracy, or in other cases when the crime consists of preparing 
for another crime, it is usually necessary to rely upon them or upon accomplices because the 
criminals will almost certainly proceed covertly." United States v. Dennis, 183 F .2d 201, 224 
(2d Cir. 1950). 
58 With the exception of grand jury investigations in white-collar crime cases, that pattern 
remains true today. See Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1905-06 ("[M)ost defendants do not see 
their lawyers until sometime after arrest."); Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: 
Updating the Ethics Codes to Include the Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 
37 B.C. L. REv. 923, 924 (1996) ("Historically, the prosecutor has played a limited role in 
the investigation of cases."). 
59 See Mann, supra note 56, at 19. 
60 See Flowers, supra note 58, at 936. 
61 Under Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, an investigating agent is 
not even permitted in the grandjury room during a witness's testimony. FED. R. CRIM. P. 
6(e). 
62 See David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World: The 
Death of Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 152 
(2000). 
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growth in the defense bar. 63 By 1977, a prominent litigator commented that 
"[ w ]hite-collar crime is the fastest growing legal specialty in the United States. "64 . 
White-collar specialists quickly learned that preventing indictment was the first 
line of defense. Limiting the government's opportunity to contact suspects and 
witnesses became a key defense strategy.65 Hoffa, Kirby and Burbine effectively 
removed the Sixth Amendment as an element in that strategy by holding that the 
right to counsel attaches only when charges are filed. As a result, white-collar 
defenders sought a new tool for achieving the same end. That tool was already in 
the code of ethics for lawyers.66 Government lawyers had beconie the principal 
managers of white-collar investigations, but there was still a disconnect. What 
remained was the significant challenge of turning a no-contact rule designed 
principally to regulate lawyers in civil litigation67 into a prohibition on police . 
interviews and the use of informants in criminal investigations. 
Given the wide gap between the traditional purpose of the ethical rule and its 
application to police investigation, it is hardly surprising that the courts were slow 
to accept the connection. Through most of the 1980s, and continuing in some 
jurisdictions today, courts generally rebuffed efforts to suppress evidence or 
discipline government attorneys because of contacts between agents or informants 
and. represented suspects or witnesses. The reasons were varied. Some courts 
refused to apply a rule of legal ethics to the conduct of non-lawyer investigators, 
despite the advisory or supel"Visory roles of prosecutors.68 Others believed the rule 
did not apply to criminal investigations in which contacts were allowed as a matter 
of constitutional law and had long been accepted practice. Those courts typically 
ruled that such contacts were "authorized by law" within the meaning of the ethical 
rule. 69 Many courts accepted the basic application of the rule to prosecutors - and 
even to agents working with them - but still declined to apply the rule before 
63 Mann, supra note 56, at 21. 
.64 Id. 
65 
"lnfonnation control entails keeping documents away from and preventing clients and 
witnesses from talking to government .investigators, prosecutors and judges." Id. at 7. 
66 The basic rule now comprising Rule 4.2 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct appeared as DR 7-104(A)(l) of the ABA Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility. Before that, the rule appeared as Canon 9 of the ABA Canons of Professional 
Ethics. For a description of the rule's history, see John Leubsdorf, Communicating with 
Another Lawyer's Client: The Lawyer's Veto and the Client's Interest, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 
683, 684-86 (1979). 
67 See Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1903-:-04 (discussing traditional application ofno-contact 
rule in civil cases and contrasting more recent efforts to apply the rule in criminal 
investigations). 
68 People v. White, 567 N.E.2d 1368 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). 
69 United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988); see United States v. 
Ryans, 903 F .2d 731, 738-39 (l 0th Cir. 1990). 
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indictment. 70 After all, those courts reasoned, the then-existing ethical rule forbid 
contact with "parties" represented in a "matter"; no one is a "party" in a "matter," 
they held, until his name appears on an indictment.71 Finally, when the issue arose 
on a motion to suppress evidence or to dismiss an indictment, some courts held that 
rules of ethics created no substantive rights for criminal defendants. 72 The sanction 
for ethical breaches, they held, was to discipline the government lawyer. 73 
Then, in 1988, shortly after the Burbine Court slammed the last door on the 
constitutional right to counsel before indictment, the Second Circuit opened a 
window for proponents of an extra-constitutional right under the rules of ethics. 74 
In United States v. Hammad,75 the court rejected the government's position that 
preindictment contacts with represented persons were beyond the reach of DR 7-
104, the predecessor to Model Rule 4.2.76 Though the Hammad court declined to 
suppress evidence obtained through such contacts, 77 its interpretation of the ethical 
rule sent shock waves through the Department of Justice. 78 In theory at least, the 
law licenses offederal prosecutors were in jeopardy for doing what they had done 
for most of two decades: managing grand jury investigations that included 
preindictment interviews by investigators, and sometimes covert contacts with 
suspects using undercover agents or informants. 
The Department reacted to Hammad with the now infamous "Thornburg 
Memorandum."79 Lawyer discipline was largely a function of state disciplinary 
10 E.g., United States v. Whittaker, 201 F.R.D. 363, 369 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
71 This interpretation conveniently equates the ethical rule with the constitutional 
standard. Contacts before indictment are unregulated, but efforts to elicit infonnation from 
a represented defendant are forbidden. In response to this limitation on the no-contact rule, 
the ABA amended Rule 4.2 to change "party" to "person." Some jurisdictions made the 
change even before the ABA. See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceeding, 876 F. Supp. 265, 
266-67 (M.D. Fla. 1993). 
72 E.g., United States v. Crook, 502 F.2d 1378, 1380-81 (3d Cir. 1974). The Third 
Circuit "share[d] the district court's unease with the practice of talking to a represented 
defendant behind his attorney's back," but the court declined to suppress the evidence 
because itdid not believe it could disregard the mandate in 18 U.S.C. § 350l(a). Crook, 502 
F.2d at 1380-81. 
73 See, e.g., United States v. Heinz, 983 F.2d 609, 613 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that 
suppression of evidence is not the appropriate remedy for Rule 4.2 violation); United States 
v. Grass, 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 646 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (holding that disciplinary action by the 
state's bar was the appropriate sanction, not suppression of evidence). 
74 United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988). 
1s Id. 
76 Id. at 838. 
77 Id. at 842 ("[T]he district court abused its discretion in suppressing the recordings and 
audiotapes .... "). 
78 Rory K. Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors?, 65 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 355, 362 (1996). 
79 Memorandum from Richard L. Thornburgh, United States Attorney General, to All 
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bodies, administered by state bar associations and overseen by state supreme 
courts.80 Relying on the federal Supremacy Clause, the Thornburg Memorandum 
asserted that preindictment contacts were "authorized by law" and not subject to 
state discipline, in essence, because the Department of Justice approved ofthem.81 
In 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno codified the Department's Supremacy Clause 
position by issuing formal regulations specifying that preindictment contacts were 
authorized if they complied with constitutional standards. 82 The express aims of 
both Thornburg and Reno were to preempt state regulation of federal 
investigations. 83 
The Department's Supremacy Clause approach turned out to be a serious 
tactical error in the ongoing national debate over prosecutors and the no-contact 
rule. When prosecutors had argued to limit the substantive reach of Rule 4.2 and 
its predecessor, DR 7-104, they had decades of history and favorable constitutional 
precedent on their side. 84 How could it be unethical, they could argue, merely to 
advise investigators to observe constitutional limits in their investigations? The 
Supremacy Clause argument, however, threatened the traditional power of states to 
regulate the practice of law. It also threatened the institutional power of the 
organized bar. A debate over investigative tactics suddenly became a debate over 
the power to regulate the practice of law. Worse yet, the Department's argument 
for self-regulation was ill-timed, coming in an age of growing concern over abuses 
of police and prosecutorial power. 85 The result was a series of setbacks in a handful 
of well-publicized cases.86 The idea that the Department ofJustice should be a law 
unto itself was a hard sell. 
Then came Joseph McDade, a Pennsylvania Congressman and erstwhile 
Justice Department Litigators (June 8, 1989), reprinted in In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 
489-93 (D.N.M. 1992). 
80 See In re Doe, F. Supp. at 484 ("Since the founding of the Republic, the licensing and 
regulation of lawyers has been left exclusively to the States and the District of Columbia 
within their respective jurisdictions."); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating 
Federal Prosecutors' Ethics, 55 V AND. L. REV. 381, 39~00 (2002) (discussing sources of 
state regulation of prosecutor's ethics). 
81 In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. at 493. 
82 28 C.F.R. § 77 (1994). For an account of the origins of the Thornburgh Memorandum 
and the Reno Rule, as well as the controversy they sparked, see Corinna Barrett Lain, 
Prosecutorial Ethics under the Reno Rule: Authorized by Law?, 14 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 17, 
22-24 (1995); Little, supra note 78, at 361-62, 375-77. 
83 See In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. at 489-93; 28 C.F.R. § 77.1. 
84 See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text. 
85 See Little, supra note 78, at 359-60 (discussing rising concern with prosecutorial 
power during the 1980s). 
86 See, e.g., United States v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d 1252, 1257 (8th Cir. 
1998); United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1457-58 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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defendant in a political corruption case.87 When his four-year battle with federal 
prosecutors ended in an acquittal in 1996, he wasted no time in proposing 
legislation to curb the "overzealousness and excessiveness of Federal 
prosecutors. "88 His bill was aimed broadly at the supremacy arguments of the Reno 
Regulation, though the committee hearings focused almost exclusively on the rules 
governing contact with represented parties.89 After an unsuccessful two-year 
odyssey through the legislative process, McDade's personal crusade resulted in a 
rider to a 1998 appropriations bill.90 The McDade Amendment, euphemistically 
styled the "Citizens Protection Act" (CPA), passed by a substantial margin and was 
signed into law in October 1998.91 
The CPA was deceptively simple, providing that: "An attorney for the 
Government shall be subject to State laws and rules, and local Federal court rules, 
governing attorneys in each State where such attorney engages in that attorney's 
duties, to the same extent and in the same manner as other attorneys in that State. "92 
Congress had buried the Department's supremacy claim with a single sentence. 
States were free to apply their own versions of the no-contact rule to federal 
prosecutors, agents, and informants. 93 
B. The Scope of White-Collar Rights After the McDade Amendment 
As we saw in Part I, the Sixth Amendment now provides suspects no protection 
against investigative contacts until the time charges are brought.94 The Fifth 
Amendment and the Due Process Clause may protect them from coercive 
interrogation, but except for suspects who demand counsel while in police 
custody,95 those provisions do not stop police from asking questions in the absence 
87 United States v. McDade, 28 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1994). 
88 Ethical Standards for Federal Prosecutors Act of I 996: Hearing on H.R. 3386 Before 
the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
104th Cong. 7 ( 1996) (testimony of Rep. Joseph McDade ). For a comprehensive account of 
the McDade Amendment's odyssey through Congress, see Zacharias & Green, supra note 
8, at 211-15. 
89 Hearings, supra note 88, at 10. 
90 H.R. 4276, 106th Cong. (1999°>; see Zacharias & Green, supra note 8, at 215 & 
nn.49-50. 
91 Zacharias & Green, supra note 8, at 215 n.53. 
92 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (2000). 
93 The CPA caused an uproar at the Department of Justice, sparked widespread debate 
within the organized bar, and gave rise to an outpouring of scholarly commentary. Most of 
the recent academic literature has dealt primarily with structural questions of federalism and 
regulatory power. For an excellent discussion of the competing claims on regulatory power, 
see Green & Zacharias, supra note 80. 
94 See supra text accompanying notes 44-45. 
95 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 4 77, 485-86 ( 1981 ). 
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of counsel. Nor do they impose significant restraints on the acquisition of 
information by deception through the use of informants. 96 
By contrast, the ethical rule forbidding contacts with represented persons 
prevents a prosecutor from "communicating" with a represented suspect either 
directly or through government agents or informants, in the absence of counsel.97 
Before addressing the wisdom or the fairness of that rule, we should pause to 
understand its potential breadth in the post-McDade world. 
That is no simple feat, of course, because the rules of ethics differ from state to 
state. Under the CPA, a federal prosecutor might be subject simultaneously to the 
ethical ~les of a host ofstates.98 An Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) 
admitted to the bar in Washington, D.C., who directs a grand jury investigation in 
Houston by advising FBI agents in New York about their contacts with witnesses 
on Wall Street, must conform to the no-contact rules of New York, Texas, and the 
District of Columbia. That kind of overlapping regulation has a ratcheting effect: 
The most restrictive rule tends to govern every case.99 
1. Investigators and Informants 
At the time of Massiah, the notion that the no-contact rule of legal ethics might 
govern the conduct of an undercover agent or informant seemed - to some on the 
Supreme Court at least - contrary to the basic purpose of the rule. 100 Today that 
is no longer the case. Whereas Rule 4.2 explicitly addresses only the conduct of 
96 The use of deceptive undercover tactics in criminal investigations has survived 
constitutional challenge several times, both before and after Hoffa. See, e.g., Weatherford v. 
Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 ( 1977); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 ( 1966); On Lee v. United 
States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). 
97 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2002). 
98 One of the principal criticisms of the McDade Amendment has been that it subjects 
federal prosecutors to multiple sources of sometimes conflicting regulation. Note, Federal 
Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade Amendment, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
2080 (2000). 
99 For example, when a corporation is represented by counsel, jurisdictions differ 
substantially over which employees are covered by the rule. Compare Messing, Rudavsky 
& Weliky, P.C. v. President & Fellows ofHarvard Coll., 764 N.E.2d 825, 833 (Mass. 2002) 
(forbidding contact with employees who exercise managerial responsibility in the matter, 
those who committed acts at issue in the litigation, and those who have authority to make 
decisions about the litigation), with Palmerv. Pioneer Hotel & Casino, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 
1162 (D. Nev. 1998) (combining the ABA standard, which covers any employees whose 
statements qualify as admissions by the corporation, with a '"managing-speaking agent'" 
standard) (quoting Wright by Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 69 l P.2d 564, 569-70 (Wash. 
1984) ). An AUSA in Boston, advising agents about undercover contacts in Las Vegas, would 
need to comply with the more restrictive Nevada rule rather than the comparatively generous 
Massachusetts approach. 
100 See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 210-11 (1964) (White, J., dissenting). 
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lawyers, 101 Rule 5.3(b) notes that "a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over 
[a] nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is 
compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer."102 The same rule adds 
that a lawyer is "responsible" for the conduct of nonlawyers if the lawyer "orders" 
or "ratifies" the conduct of the nonlawyer. 103 
If you were to ask most FBI agents if they were "supervised" or "ordered" to 
act by AUSAs or other Justice Department lawyers, you might receive a cold stare, · 
a polite chuckle, or an officially accurate response that said "only by the Attorney 
General." As a practical matter in white-collar cases, however, the relationship 
between prosecutor and investigator includes elements of both management and 
partnership. 104 Today, unless the agent acts independently of the prosecutor, or 
contrary to her advice, odds are strong that courts and bar disciplinary committees 
will hold the lawyer responsible for investigative contacts. 105 The same may be true 
of informants operating at the direction of government investigators. 106 In the post-
McDade world of white-collar investigation, the rules of ethics can hold prosecutors 
responsible for the type ofundercover contacts that brought down Jimmy Hoffa, as 
well as for interviews of represented persons by federal agents. 
2. What is "Communication" with a Represented Party? 
Rule 4.2 instructs a lawyer not to "communicate" with a represented party. 107 
But what if an informant is in a position simply to listen to a suspect who willingly 
101 By contrast, DR 7-104provided that "a lawyer shall not. .. [c]ommunicate or cause 
another to communicate on the subject of the representation with a party he knows to be 
represented by a lawyer." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104 (1990) 
(emphasis added). 
102 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2002). 
103 Id. R. 5.3(c). 
104 See Flowers, supra note 58, at 934-39 (discussing how, in undercover investigations, 
prosecutors help to "assure the legality of the investigation by advising law enforcement 
agencies" and that "courts have recognized the importance of the involvement of the 
prosecutor in the investigative stage"). 
105 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Fonnal Op. 95-396, at 19-21 
(1995) [hereinafter ABA Opinion]. 
106 As a general proposition, Rule 5.3 would hold prosecutors responsible for the conduct 
of informants to the same degree that they might be responsible for the conduct of agents, as 
long as the infonnants are "supervised" or their conduct "ratified" by the prosecutor. Some 
courts, however, have balked at extending the rule to cover all contacts by informants, noting 
the long history of court approval of undercover tactics in criminal investigation. The 
Hammad court, for example, concluded that at least some types ofinfonnant contact were 
"authorized by law" within the meaning of Rule 4.2. United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 
840 (2d Cir. 1988). 
107 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2002). 
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speaks? In the Sixth Amendment arena - where the protection arises after a 
defendant is charged - passive listening is allowed even when infonnants are · 
deliberately placed in jails or holding cells for the purpose of being near the 
accused. 108 The Constitution only prohibits efforts to "deliberately elicit" 
incriminating statements in counsel's absence. 109 The ethical rule, however, is 
broader, at least in the eyes of some courts. A prosecutor, directly or through an 
agent, ma)' violate the rule simply by listening, even when the represented party 
initiates the communication. 110 
3. "Subjects," "Matters," and Continuing Crimes 
The no-contact rule forbids communication "about the subject of the 
representation" with a person "represented ... in the matter. " 111 Again, even after 
indictment, the Sixth Amendment draws an extremely narrow zone of protection 
based on subject matter. The right to counsel attaches with respect to the particular 
crime charged. 112 In most cases, it does not extend even to closely related 
offenses. 113 
By contrast, in some jurisdictions, Rule 4.2 applies during an investigation, well 
before an indictment formally defines the "matter" at issue. 114 Prosecutors seldom 
announce the aims and boundaries of a grand jury investigation while it is 
underway. As a result, Rule 4.2 provides significantly broader protection to 
suspects at the investigative stage than the Sixth Amendment provides even for 
those formally charged with a crime. 115 If prosecutors or agents are interested 
enough to make the investigative contact, then chances are strong that it will be 
covered by the Rule. 
The breadth of Rule 4.2 causes particular problems for prosecutors when 
evidence suggests that a target is continuing his criminal activity or committing new 
108 See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 456-57 (1986). In Kuhlmann, the Court 
determined that "the defendant must demonstrate that the police and their infonnant took 
some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating 
remarks." Id. at 459. 
109 Id. at 457. 
110 See In re Howes, 940 P.2d 159, 165-66 (N.M. 1997); see also ABA Opinion, supra 
note 105, at 18-19. 
111 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2002). 
112 Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167~72 (2001). 
113 See id. (holding that defendant's confession in the absence of counsel was admissible 
in murder prosecution, even though counsel had been appointed for a burglary charge and 
murder had occurred during burglary). 
114 See United States v. Hilmmad, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988). 
115 Rule 4.2 covers all communication "about the subject of the representation." MODEL 
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2002). The "subject" of the representation typically 
would be the investigation itself. 
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crimes in an effort to obstruct the investigation. When a whistleblower inside a 
represented corporation calls the FBI to report that his boss is shredding documents, 
a prosecutor may sense an important break in the case. But she should also sense 
the looming possibility of an ethical violation if she encourages agents to meet 
privately with the insider, or to offer the insider a recording device for his next 
conversation with the boss. 116 The dilemma is compounded for the prosecutor 
because she knows that ethics authorities ultimately will judge her choices with the 
benefit of hindsight. 117 If the allegations of continuing crimes or obstruction are 
unfounded or impossible to prove, or if the whistleblower conveniently rediscovers 
his loyalty to his employer, then the prosecutor's choice will look like a calculated 
end-run around corporate counsel. 
4. Communication Initiated by the Client: A Rule of Waiver or Permission? 
Waiver of Sixth Amendment rights presents a difficult puzzle for courts. If the 
right includes an opportunity to be advised by counsel, how can police ask a 
defendant to waive it when counsel is not present? But even in the murky area of 
Sixth Amendment waivers, one thing seems clear: A suspect can waive the right 
by initiating the communication himself. 118 
The no-contact rule of ethics is more restrictive. In the eyes of the ABA and 
some courts, 119 the rule applies even when a represented person picks up the phone 
and contacts the FBI, and even when he says that he does not want his lawyer 
116 In the Ninth Circuit, at least, a prosecutor might take some comfort from United States 
v. Ta/ao, 222 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2000). In that case, the court found that California's no-
contact rule did not prohibit an AUSA from listening when a corporate bookkeeper initiated 
a conversation in which she disclosed that corporate officers were attempting to suborn 
perjury. Id. at 1140. 
117 See, e.g .. 66 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 573, 592 (Mar. 29, 2000) (reporting views of an 
AUSA that he would not even try to detennine which corporate employees might be subject 
to investigative contact under Rule 4.2 for fear of later losing the case based on 
"misperception"). 
118 See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986) ("[A]n accused person in custody who 
has 'expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further 
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the 
accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the 
police."') (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (emphasis added)). 
119 Compare People v. Green, 274 N.W.2d 448, 453 (Mich. 1979) (noting that a 
represented person's willingness to talk will "not excuse compliance with ... DR 7-
104(A)( l )"),and ABA Opinion, supra note 105, at 17 (noting that a represented person may 
not be able to make an infonned waiver without counsel's assistance), with United States v. 
Talao, 222 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the no-contact rule did not prohibit 
prosecutor from listening when represented person initiated conversation in order to disclose 
ongoing crime). 
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involved. Though the ABA recognizes that this approach seems "paternalistic," it 
argues that the rule is designed to prevent uninformed waiver and to protect the 
"effectiveness" of the lawyer's representation. 120 Under that view, until the client 
takes the formal step of discharging the lawyer, the client has no power to waive the 
rule. The lawyer must give permission for any contact. · 
5. Corporations, Officers and Employees 
The broadest application of the no-contact rule - and accordingly the most 
troublesome for prosecutors - occurs when a corporation is represented during 
criminaHnvestigation. The rule prohibits contact with a represented "person," a 
term that includes corporations. 121 But who within the corporation is protected from 
contact? Jurisdictions are divided on this critical issue. 122 Prior to a 2002 revision, 
the official Comment to ABA Model Rule 4.2 stated that a represented "person" 
includes not only top corporate managers within the so-called control group, but 
also ariy employee "whose statement may constitute an admission on the part of the 
organization."123 Under the law of evidence, a current employee's statement is an 
admission of the corporation if it relates to a matter within the scope of his 
employment. 124 Therefore, as a practical matter, the ABA rule prohibited contact 
with almost any employee· who has useful information, except when corporate 
counsel consents or is present. 125 In those jurisdictions that still adhere to this broad 
version of the rule, a corporation effectively can shield all of its employees from 
direct contact with investigators simply by hiring an attorney. 126 
120 ABA Opitiion, supra note 105, at 17. 
121 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2, cmt. 7 (2002). 
122 See supra note 99; see also Jerome N. Krulewitch, Ex Parle Communications with 
Corporate Parties: The Scope of the Limitations on Attorney Communications with One of 
Adverse Interest, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 1274, 1275 (1988) (noting that differences in 
interpretation of the no-contact rule have "made it virtually impossible ... to determine the 
ethical limit of ex parte interviews when the opposing party is a corporation"). 
123 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 4 (200 l ). That language was omitted 
from the official Comment to Rule 4.2 in the 2002 Edition of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct as a consequence of the ABA's "Ethics 2000" project. See MODEL 
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. (2002). 
124 See FED. R. EVID. 80l(d)(2)(D). 
125 As one court noted, the ABA test would "effectively prohibit the questioning of all 
employees who can offer information helpful to the litigation." Messing, Rudavsky & 
Weliky, P.C. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 764 N.E.2d 825, 833 (2002). 
126 After the 2002 revisions, the ABA's official comment to Rule 4.2 provides, in part: 
In the case of a represented organization, the Rule prohibits communications 
with a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly 
consults with the organizations' lawyer concerning the matter or has authority 
to obligate the organization with respect to the matter or whose act or omission 
in connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes 
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III. RETHINKING WHITE-COLLAR RIGHTS 
A. Unequal Protection: Rule 4.2 as a White-Collar Right 
By definition, the rule restricting communication with "represented persons" 
protects only those who are "represented. "127 But very few suspects have counsel 
before they are charged. As a practical matter, therefore, the no-contact rule 
protects only a small percentage of those under investigation for crime. For reasons 
outlined below, it protects corporations and individuals suspected of white-collar 
crimes, but almost no one else. 
For three principal reasons, most suspects are unrepresented before the time of 
arrest and formal charge. First, many suspects do not know they are suspects. 
Investigations of violent crimes and drug crimes, in particular, are likely to remain 
covert until the moment of arrest because of concerns over flight from prosecution, 
witness intimidation, or worse. Undercover techniques-which typically require 
the investigation to remain a secret - are used in those cases more often than in 
the investigation of financial crimes. 128 Second, many routine criminal investigations 
simply happen too fast for lawyers to get involved. Police typically respond to a 
report of crime in progress, the blue lights fla.Sh, and pursuit is immediate. The police 
make contact with the suspect at the time of arrest and sometimes for several hours 
afterward in an interrogation room. Lawyers on both sides hear about the case just 
before an arraignment or bail hearing the following day. Third, few suspects of 
criminal investigations can afford a lawyer. 129 The vast majority of criminal 
defendants, even those charged with the most serious crimes, are represented at trial 
by appointed counsel. 130 To my knowledge, no American jurisdiction routinely 
appoints counsel at public expense for those who have not yet been charged with 
of civil or criminal liability. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2002). While slightly narrower than the 
previous version, the revised comment still includes a wide array of corporate officers and 
agents. A corporate agent's act may be "imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or 
criminal liability" if the agent acted within the scope of employment and, at least in part, with 
the intent to benefit the corporation. See United States v. Automated Med. Labs., 770 F.2d 
399 (4th Cir. 1985). 
127 MODELRULESOFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 4.2 {2002). 
128 The nature of the investigative tactics in white-collar crime may be changing. Tactics 
such as wiretaps and search warrants, traditionally employed to investigate street crime and 
narcotics cases, are appearing more often in white-collar investigations. See JULIE R. 
O'SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS l 0 (200 l ). 
129 See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and 
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 28-29 (1997). 
130 Approximately eighty percent of felony defendants are represented by appointed 
counsel. Id. at 7 nn.7, 28 (1997) (citing Steven K. Smith & Carol J. DeFrances, Indigent 
Defense, BUREAU JUST. STAT. SELECTED FINDINGS, Feb. 1996, at 1, 4). 
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crime.13 1 Thus, for both practical and financial reasons, most suspects in most 
investigations must go it alone, at least until the handcuffs are applied and the 
complaint or indictment is filed. 
In white-collar investigations, by contrast, suspects and even witnesses with little 
criminal exposure are much more likely to be represented by counsel during an 
investigation. 132 White-collar investigations often stretch for months, even years. 133 
They seldom remain covert for long. Target corporations and individuals typically 
learn of the investigation through the arrival of a subpoena and respond by hiring 
counsel. 134 Unlike suspects of common street crime, suspects of Wall Street or 
Main Street crime often have the means to hire a lawyer. 135 Even more significant, 
major white-collar investigations typically involve the conduct of one or more 
business organizations. 136 Target corporations generally hire a lawyer - often 
many lawyers - to respond to the investigation. 137 As we have seen, once the 
corporation retains a lawyer, the no-contact rule can shield virtually all of its officers 
and employees from any contact not pre-approved by corporate counsel. 
I overgeneralize only slightly when I suggest that, as a practical matter, Rule 4.2 
and the CPA create a category of "white-collar rights." The shield of the no-
contact rule is available to corporations and individuals suspected of major financial 
crimes, but to few others. At least when it comes to Rule 4.2, Congressman 
McDade' s "Citizens Protection Act" protects only a select portion of the citizenry: 
corporations, their managers, and others with the means to hire counsel before they 
are charged with any crime.138 
131 For example, the federal Criminal Justice Act (CJA) calls for representation only for 
persons "charged" with a felony or class A misdemeanor. 18 U.S.C. § 3006(a)(l )(A) (2000). 
The statute has been applied flexibly in those few cases where federal prosecutors provide 
written notice to a suspect that he is about to be charged and advising him to obtain counsel 
for plea discussions. In such cases, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 
(AOUSC) has viewed the prosecutor's notice as a "charge" under the CJA, thereby allowing 
for pre-indictment appointment of counsel. See Letter from Paul E. Denicoff, Staff Attorney, 
AOUSC, to Mary Elizabeth Manton, Federal Public Defense (June 3, 1992) (on file with 
author). 
132 Stuntz, supra note 129, at 30 n.103. 
133 See O'SULLIVAN, supra note 128, at 13-14. 
134 Id. 
135 Stuntz, supra note 129, at 29-30 & n .. 103 ("Almost by definition, white collar crime 
tends to involve defendants with money.") (citing DAVID WEISBURD ET AL., CRIMES OF THE 
MIDDLE CLASSES 100-01 & tbl.5.2 (1991)). 
136 See O'SULLIVAN, supra note 128, at 13-14. 
137 Id. at 14. 
138 H.R. 4276, 106th Cong. (1999). 
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B. Asking the Wrong Question About "Parity": Shouldn't We Treat 
Prosecutors Like Other Lawyers? 
Ever since the Justice Department chose to oppose state bar regulation of 
federal investigations on Supremacy Clause grounds, 139 the focus of the debate over 
the no-contact rule has shifted in a direction almost certain to doom the 
Department's position. Proponents of the McDade approach ask simply, "Why 
shouldn't federal prosecutors be held to the same ethical standards as other 
attomeys?"140 When the question is framed in that manner, the "right" answer 
seems unavoidable. 
But when it comes to deciding how-or whether-to apply Rule 4.2 to forbid 
investigative contacts with represented persons, the "parity of ethics" question puts 
the debate in a false light. Applying the no-contact rule to criminal investigators 
does not result in equal treatment of prosecutors in comparison to other lawyers. 
To the contrary, in criminal investigations, the rule operates almost exclusively in one 
direction. As a practical matter, it limits only the conduct of the prosecutor and 
government agents. With rare exceptions, it does nothing to limit the access of 
white-collar defense counsel to anyone. 141 
The debate over Rule 4.2 in criminal investigations has little to do with insuring 
parity of ethics among different segments of the bar. It is primarily a struggle over 
"information control" in white-collar investigations. As Kenneth Mann's study of 
white-collar practitioners observed, "[t]he defense attorney's first objective is to 
prevent the government from obtaining evidence that could be inculpatory of his 
client." 142 Keeping investigators away from suspects and potential witnesses is an 
139 See supra text accompanying notes 81-86. 
140 See, e.g., Sapna K. Khatiwala, Note, Toward Uniform Application of the "No-Contact" 
Rule: McDade is the Solution, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 111, 128 (1999) (suggesting that 
federal prosecutors could be "bound by state ethics rules as are all other attorneys" and still 
function effectively). 
141 Normally, defense counsel is not limited by the rule because her opponent, the 
prosecutor, does not represent any "person." She is free to contact any witness who will talk 
to her, including government employees and agents. The one-sided application of Rule 4.2 
in criminal investigations is evident from the track record of the rule. Virtually all of the 
reported cases involve conduct by prosecutors, not by white-collar defense counsel. See, 
e.g., supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text. Of course, in a few cases, the rule will restrict 
defense counsel, who represents one individual suspect, from contacting another individual 
witness or suspect if that person is represented separately. See United States v. Franklin, 177 
F. Supp. 2d 459 (E.D. Va. 2001). As a practical matter, however, there is a high level of 
coordination and cooperation among defense counsel representing multiple suspects in 
white-collar cases. See Mann, supra note 56, at 175-76. Joint defense agreements and other 
cooperative approaches allow for sharing of information within the defense camp, and make 
the rule's limits less burdensome. Id. 
142 Mann, supra note 56, at 6. 
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effective means of preventing the government from obtaining evidence, and that is 
the principal function of Rule 4.2 in white-collar investigations. 
The relevant question is not whether federal prosecutors should adhere to the 
same "ethical" standards as others. We can answer "yes" to that question without 
beginning to address the real - non-ethical - issues raised by the no-contact rule. 
Instead, the relevant Rule 4.2 question should focus on the lack of parity in 
treatment of those individuals subject to criminal_investigation. Quite simply, due 
to Rule 4.2 and the McDade Amendment, white-collar suspects can buy more 
favorable treatment than others. As Congress, the courts, and state bar disciplinary 
committees continue the debate over Rule 4.2, they should ask whether the interests 
served by the no-contact rule are sufficient to justify that difference in treatment. 
C. The Real Question of Parity: Shouldn 't We Treat White-Collar Suspects Like 
Other Suspects? 
In theory, the primary interest served by the no-contact rule is to protect the 
client from an overreaching opponent. 143 The rule prevents lawyers from "taking 
advantage" of lay persons who lack special skill and training in legal matters. 144 
That rationale may ring true when we imagine the process of negotiating a 
settlement in a civil case. However, when we apply it to criminal investigations, in 
which the contact typically comes through an informant or a detective, the rationale 
begins to lose force. Informants may take advantage of suspects. Indeed they may 
deliberately deceive them. But that deception has nothing to do with the 
informant's legal training. Nor does that rationale make much sense when applied 
to police questioning. Though some investigators may be skilled in legal matters, 
and even more skilled in taking advantage of suspects, 145 those skills are not the 
concern of codes of legal ethics. 
The white-collar prosecutor's involvement at a supervisory level does little to 
change this equation. The prosecutor's principal supervisory role is to ensure that 
investigators operate within constitutional limits. 146 To punish prosecutors for 
doing that job is to twist the concept of "ethics" beyond recognition. As a policy 
matter, it makes little sense to apply rules oflegal ethics for this purpose. Over the 
long haul, the likely effect of the rule will be to remove prosecutors from 
undercover investigations and leave agents on their own. 147 Indeed, given a little 
143 Leubsdorf, supra note 66, at 686-87 . 
. 144 Id. 
145 Police, of course, are trained in interrogation methods that aim to take advantage of the 
psychological weaknesses of a suspect or to deceive him into believing that he will benefit 
from talking. Indeed, the Miranda opinion devoted pages to describing such tactics. See 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448-55 (1966). 
146 See Flowers, supra note 58, at 934-35. 
147 See Note, supra note 98, at 2091 ("One of the greatest dangers of the McDade 
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time and the current incentives under the McDade Amendment, the FBI would be 
wise to ~et up a new office of "undercover supervision" and staff it fully with 
nonlawyers. 
For our "parity" analysis, the more critical point is that the same police tactics 
that the no-contact rule may prohibit in white-collar cases - direct questioning by 
agents and undercover approaches by infonnants148 - are widely used and 
permitted by courts in other cases. 149 When it comes to advantage-taking, there is 
no reason to favor a white-collar target, who is represented by counsel, over an 
unrepresented suspect in a routine street-crime investigation. The teenage suspect 
interrogated by a narcotics detective is no less likely to be taken advantage of than 
is the corporate executive accosted on his front porch by an FBI agent. 150 It is hard 
to explain why the law should protect the executive and not the teenager. Yet that 
is exactly what the no-contact rule does. 
In an effort to make the no-contact rule sound more like a rule of ethics, its 
purpose is sometimes articulated in terms of counsel's effectiveness. 151 The rule 
promotes the effectiveness of counsel, in theory, by preventing the client from 
making unwise and damaging admissions that will then make the lawyer's efforts 
futile. At its core, this is essentially the "taking advantage" claim in slightly 
different clothing. 152 It amounts to an argument that once a suspect has been 
fortunate enough to retain a lawyer, he should be protected against the 
consequences of any foolish choice that he makes by ignoring his lawyer's advice. 
There is, of course, no such right for ordinary criminal suspects under the Sixth 
Amendment. In many criminal cases, counsel's ultimate "effectiveness" -
meaning her ability to achieve a favorable result through trial or plea - is 
undermined by foolish choices made by her client in her absence. Aside from its 
temporary detour in Escobedo, 153 the Court's reaction to such cases has been a 
Amendment ... is that federal prosecutors may feel compelled to dissociate themselves from 
undercover investigations .... "). 
148 See supra Part 11.B.5. 
149 See, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 
745 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
150 Indeed, the white-collar suspect has a distinct advantage that the common burglar does 
not: The white-collar suspect has a lawyer who has told him not to talk to anyone about the 
case. 
151 See ABA Opinion, supra note 105, at 332-33. The "effectiveness of counsel" 
articulation of the rule's purpose should sound familiar in light of our Sixth Amendment 
history lesson. See supra Part I. It is essentially the same claim that the Escobedo Court 
adopted when it held that the suspect's trial should not be "an appeal from the interrogation." 
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 487 (1964). Of course, that is a rationale that the Court 
has abandoned for the purposes of Sixth Amendment analysis. See supra Part I. 
152 See supra text accompanying notes 143-45. 
153 Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 491-92 (holding the petitioner's confession inadmissible 
because it was obtained after he became the focus of investigation and requested the 
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rather explicit, "So what?"154 It is hard to see why the rule should be different for 
a white-collar suspect simply because he retains counsel before, rather than after, 
the opportunity to put his foot in his mouth. When an as-yet-unrepresented street 
drug dealer sells cocaine to a police informant, he handicaps his trial counsel's 
future effectiveness no less than the already-represented accountant who asks her 
secretary to shred documents, not knowing that the secretary is concealing a 
government-issued recording device. In either case, counsel's "effectiveness" is 
equally "impaired," yet the no-contact rule would shield the crooked accountant but 
not the street dealer. 
In sum, when it comes to protecting a suspect from "advantage taking" or from 
the consequences of foolish choices, there is little reason for distinguishing the 
typical, unrepresented suspect from the represented target of a white-collar 
investigation. Both individuals are imposed upon equally by the process of 
investigation. Indeed, by virtue of education, status, and access to legal advice, the 
white-collar suspect probably is less vulnerable to the guile of investigators and 
therefore less in need of the shield of a no-contact rule. But he is the one who gets 
its protection. 
Of course, protection against advantage-taking is not the only purpose of the no-
contact rule. The rule is supposed to serve two other important functions: ( 1) to 
protect the attorney-client relationship from an opponent's interference; 155 and (2) 
to protect against disclosure of privileged communications and waiver of 
privilege. 156 On the surface, these seem like serious concerns. A suspect should 
have access to his counsel and full opportunity for confidential communication. A 
suspect also should have the right to protect those communications from disclosure. 
Significantly, for purposes of our "parity" analysis, these interests would separate 
the represented suspect from the unrepresented suspect in a meaningful way. After 
all, the unrepresented suspect has no relationship and no privilege to protect. 
It seems unlikely, however, that the no-contact rule really serves these interests 
in most cases. Direct contacts by investigators or informants do not limit a 
suspect's access to counsel, 157 nor do they limit his opportunities for confidential 
consultation. The client is free to rebuff the investigator's approaches or to decline 
to speak about the matter when asked by a colleague-turned-informant. After all, 
that is exactly what his lawyer would have told him to do. When a client can avoid 
damaging admissions by following his lawyer's advice, it is hard to see how an 
assistance of counsel). 
154 See Moran v. Burbirie, 475 U.S. 412, 430 (1986) ("The Sixth Amendment's intended 
function is not ... to protect a suspect from the consequences of his own candor."). 
155 See ABA Opinion, supra note 105, at 2-3. 
156 See id.; Leubsdorf, supra note 66, at 686. 
157 Massiah, after all, could speak with his lawyer all he wanted. See Massiah v. United 
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
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investigator has interfered with the attorney-client relationship. 158 
As for disclosure of privileged infonnation, that concern seems unlikely to arise 
in most cases. A client's knowledge does not become privileged merely because he 
may have told his lawyer what he knows. If the client ·tells the same story to an 
investigator, there has been no breach of any privilege. Certainly there is no breach 
where the client lies to his lawyer but admits the truth to a friend who turns out to 
be an infonnant. Concern over privilege may be a more serious matter when the 
person contacted is herself an attorney or an attorney's assistant. In those 
presumably rare cases, however, the client who holds the privilege has additional 
protections, including the ethical rules governing the contacted attorney. 159 
Finally, in addition to considering the interests that the no-contact rule may be 
designed to protect, it is worth pausing to recognize the interests that it threatens. 
The most obvious, of course, is the interest in detennining the truth. There are 
serious "infonnation costs" to a no-contact rule in criminal investigations. The 
Fifth Amendment allows most suspects to deflect most questions. Lawyers 
defending white-collar suspects use the privilege liberally, 160 and they would be 
foolish to do otherwise. "[A]ny lawyer worth his salt," the Court has noted, will 
advise a client not to speak if there is a serious risk that his words will hurt him. 161 
When witnesses speak with counsel at their side, they choose their words carefully, 
often having rehearsed them beforehand under counsel's tutelage. Impromptu 
contacts are favored by investigators because witnesses and suspects are more likely 
to speak, and to speak candidly. Undercover contacts are especially favored, 
because an unsuspecting suspect is most likely to discuss wrongdoing with someone 
he believes to be a partner in crime. Massiah may have been duped, but his candid 
words to a co-conspirator revealed the truth. 162 
One clear cost of a no-contact rule is that it makes guilt easier to hide. The flip 
side is equally true but too seldom acknowledged by proponents of a no-contact 
rule: The rule also makes it harder to identify innocence. 163 
158 Of course, the client may ignore counsel's advice and make admissions that he later 
regrets. In those cases, there may be a problem in the attorney-client relationship, but it is not 
the result of the contact. Indeed, the contact and the regrets that follow will merely reinforce 
the attorney's advice. 
159 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l .6(a) (2002) (concerning confidentiality of 
infonnation). 
160 See Mann, supra note 56, at 7-8, 135. 
161 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson,J., concurringinpartanddissenting 
in part). 
162 See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 203 (1964). 
163 For a compelling argument that applying a rigid no-contact rule in criminal 
investigations tends to benefit the guilty at the expense of innocent parties, see Stuntz, supra 
note 7, at 1944-54. 
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D. Should We Treat Corporations Most Favorably of All? 
Major white-collar investigations typically involve the conduct of business 
organizations. 164 The corporation itself may be a target, and most of the individual 
suspects as well as the potential witnesses are likely to be corporate officers or 
employees. The key documents are largely within their control. They have formed 
bonds of loyalty to one another and to their corporate employer, and they have 
strong financial incentives to remain loyal. As a result, finding a candid insider may 
be the most significant roadblock to unearthing wrongdoing inside the corporation. 
In this environment, the "information cost" of the no-contact rule takes on special 
significance. 
When the "represented person" is the corporation itself, the no-contact rule 
grants protections far more extensive than those afforded any represented 
individual. 165 At least in those jurisdictions which accept the ABA 's broad reading, 
the rule grants corporate counsel a veto power over government interviews or 
undercover contacts with virtually all of the key witnesses in the case. 166 Given the 
broad reach of the rule's protection for corporations, it is worth asking why we 
should embrace a rule with such potential to stymie the investigation of insiders. 
As I suggested above, arguments about overreaching and advantage-taking with 
regard to represented individuals have little force when we compare the law's 
treatment of most criminal suspects. Those claims sound particularly hollow when 
we apply them to corporations. Individuals at least have the Fifth Amendment right 
not to be forced to talk. Most of the "special skill" brought to bear when criminal 
investigators ''take advantage" of individuals is aimed at circumventing that 
privilege. 167 A principal function of counsel during a criminal investigation is to 
164 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
165 Those protections may be limited in some instances when individual employees retain 
their own counsel. But as a practical matter, corporate counsel often still exercises a high 
degree of control over government access to witnesses. After all, it is often the corporation 
that retains counsel for individual suspects, and it is corporate counsel who often helps select 
those attorneys. Not surprisingly, defense efforts tend to present a united front to the 
government, with the multiple defendants sharing information internally through joint defense 
agreements. Cf Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1949-50 (regarding counsel's ability to maintain a 
"wall of silence" in organized crime investigations). When corporate counsel employs the no-
contact rule to erect a wall of silence, the government's only access to insiders may be 
through the grand jury subpoena process. That approach can be time-consuming and 
inefficient at best. It may be ineffectual when witnesses have been carefully prepared to avoid 
damaging disclosures. 
166 See Frank 0. Bowman, III, A Bludgeon by Any Other Name: The Misuse of "Ethical 
Rules" Against Prosecutors to Control the Law of the State, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 665, 
669-70 ( 1996). 
167 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448-55 (1966) (describing the techniques 
interrogators use to cause a suspect to confess). 
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give advice with respect to that privilege. Corporations, however, have no Fifth 
Amendment privilege. 168 Compelling a corporation to assist with a criminal 
investigation is hardly "taking advantage," and it has nothing to do with 
circumventing the Fifth Amendment. 
Corporations are protected by an attorney-client privilege, 169 and proponents of 
the no-contact rule suggest that it protects that privilege. 170 But, almost by 
definition, statements by corporate employees to investigators or informants are not 
privileged.171 And except in unusual cases, 172 such statements are unlikely to 
disclose anything privileged. A broad no-contact rule is both unnecessary and 
overbroad when it comes to protecting the privilege. 
In one sense, the no-contact rule can have a perverse effect on privilege. 
Corporate counsel often will conduct her own "internal investigation" when 
allegations of corporate wrongdoing surface.1 73 Counsel's interviews with 
employees are subject to the attorney-client privilege, but it is the corporation's 
privilege. 174 In part because of Rule 4.2, the government's efforts to contact those 
same witnesses may be stymied. When the government's investigation moves to a 
stage of plea bargaining with the corporation, the price of the bargain quite often is 
a waiver of that corporate privilege. 175 In effect, the government can demand to 
receive through the bargain what the no-contact rule had denied during the 
investigation. If the bargain is struck with the corporation, as it often is, the 
individuals who had "confidential" communications with corporate counsel are left 
out in the cold. Their conversations may be disclosed to the government when the 
corporation waives its privilege. 176 In this indirect fashion, a rule designed to 
protect privilege may actually have the ·opposite effect. 
Finally, we should consider an even more central question that arises when we 
apply the no-contact rule to protect corporations as "represented persons." Whose 
interests does the rule protect? The answer cannot, or at least should not, be that 
it protects individual insiders. After all, it is not their interest that corporate counsel 
168 Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 105 (1988); see Bellis v. United States, 417 
U.S. 85 (1974). 
169 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981) (extending the attorney-client 
privilege to corporate communications). 
170 See ABA Opinion, supra note 105, at 2-3. 
171 See supra text accompanying notes 158-59. 
172 The greatest risk of disclosure would arise where the person contacted by investigators 
was herself an attorney or assistant to a corporate attorney. Of course, that kind of contact 
could be regulated by a rule much narrower than Rule 4.2. 
173 See, e.g., Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386-87. 
174 Id. at 392-97. 
175 See David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World: The 
Death of Privilege in Corporate Criminallnvestigations, 3 7 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 14 7, 14 7-48 
(2000). 
176 See id. 
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is hired to protect. The short answer might be "the corporation's interest," but that 
answer simply begs the real question. A better answer might be "the shareholders," 
but even that one has some rough edges. At least in publicly traded companies, 
shareholders may have a variety of interests, even conflicting interests, with respect 
to a criminal investigation. Depending upon the time they chose to invest, and the 
reasons for investing, some may be the victims while others may be the 
beneficiaries of the very conduct under investigation. Some may sell and others 
may buy while an investigation is underway. As several recent and widely 
publicized investigations suggest, some shareholders may benefit when an 
investigation unearths wrongdoing by insiders, especially when those insiders have 
substantial assets that may be recouped for the benefit of shareholder-victims. 177 
In that environment, it is far from clear that a no-contact rule - which 
generally serves to inhibit disdosure of information regarding the conduct of 
corporate insiders - should be regarded as a tool that protects the "corporate" 
interest. It is worth considering, at least, whether the interests of shareholders 
specifically, and the investing public generally, would be better served by a rule that 
promotes candid disclosure. 
CONCLUSION 
Jimmy Hoffa died without getting what he sought from the Supreme Court: a 
no-contact rule that would keep investigators and informants away from criminal 
suspects whenever they were savvy enough, or wealthy enough, to hire counsel. 
But Rule 4.2 and the McDade Amendment have revived Hoffa's dream in the form 
of a new white-collar right: a broad protection for corporations and their managers 
against the sort of investigation that brought Hoffa down. In a world that suddenly 
seems beset by corporate scandal, it is worth asking whether special treatment for 
white-collar suspects makes sense. Jimmy Hoffa might enjoy the irony in the way 
things have worked out. But he would be laughing at our expense. 
177 In the investigation of Enron Corporation, for example, a plea agreement with fonner 
executive Michael J. Kopper resulted in his surrender of$12 million. See Carrie Johnson, Ex-
Enron Official Will Plead Guilty: First Case Against a Company Executive, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 21, 2002, at Al. 

